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Abstract 
What does global citizenship mean in the public sphere of a Western state?  
As part of an historically unprecedented, globally co-ordinated, NGO-led 
campaign against poverty in the under-developed South, ‘Make Poverty 
History’ attempted to give this question an answer.  Cultural politics was 
integral to the campaign: Make Poverty History was not only mediated (as 
all campaigns must be); it aimed to form global citizens with obligations to 
non-nationals outside the territorial boundaries of the state within national 
media.  One of the most interesting aspects of this attempt was the 
engagement with popular culture and the importance of mobilising emotions 
in relation to distant suffering.  This article discusses the extraordinary 
originality of this campaign in terms of its aims and means, and draws 
conclusions from its attempt to achieve cosmopolitan solidarity.   
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Cultural politics and global citizenship  
‘Make Poverty History’ was an extraordinary campaign: historically 
unprecedented, indeed impossible without the new structures of the emerging 
‘cosmopolitanising state’, global in reach and yet national in focus.  Studying 
the aims, means and achievements of Make Poverty History has much to teach 
us about the practical possibilities for a more cosmopolitan orientation to 
citizenship within and beyond national borders.  As a campaign which took 
place not just through but in the media, investigating Make Poverty History is 
also important for media studies, enabling understanding of the importance of 
national media and popular culture to emergent possibilities of global 
citizenship.  
 
Make Poverty History is the name given to the UK branch of a global alliance 
of NGOs co-ordinated by the Global Call to Action against Poverty to put 
pressure on the leaders of the richest countries to achieve the concrete, 
measurable Millennium Development Goals they’d already signed up to 
achieving.  The Global Call to Action against Poverty had different names in 
different countries: ONE in US, ‘Plus d’Excuses!’ in France, Maak Het Waar in 
the Netherlands and so on.  Although, as we shall see, Make Poverty History 
was very carefully managed as a media campaign, it was also genuinely 
grassroots insofar as it was led by a coalition of over 500 NGOs which receive 
their funding from donations and membership.  They ranged from the large, 
international NGOs like Oxfam and Save the Children to smaller, often more 
radical organisations, like World Development Movement and Womankind.   
 
In a very well-known article, Craig Calhoun has criticised theorists of 
cosmopolitanism for conceiving of it in elitist, over-rationalist and 
individualist terms, and for neglecting the social and cultural bases of 
solidarity (Calhoun 2003).  Bryan Turner has made a similar argument with 
respect to the weakening of citizenship as a result of globalisation, arguing 
that, as membership criteria become more diffuse and the benefits of 
citizenship are eroded, individualist cosmopolitan virtues become dominant, at 
least among elites and those who aspire to be part of them (Turner 2000, 
2002).  The campaign to ‘Make Poverty History’ is interesting in this respect as 
an attempt at ‘actually existing’, popular cosmopolitan solidarity across 
borders.  It aimed to transform national citizens into global citizens by creating 
obligations towards people suffering outside the nation.  In order to do so, 
Make Poverty History performatively created public space within national 
media for the formation of consensus to extend citizenship beyond national 
borders (see Dayan 2001 on performative publics).  Citizenship is understood 
here in sociological terms: it is a set of legal and political rights and 
responsibilities and also an inter-subjectively recognised status (Marshall 
1992).  As an inter-subjectively recognised status, citizenship is reflexive, 
containing the logical and practical possibility of reaching beyond itself, 
beyond existing schedules of rights and responsibilities to create new 
relationships between individuals and groups.   It is in this respect that culture, 
and especially popular culture, is essential to the creation, maintenance and 
extension of meanings of citizenship (see Couldry 2006 for a similar 
understanding of the relationship between citizenship and culture).  In this 
sense cultural politics provide the conditions of citizenship, of its weakening 
and displacement on the one hand, or of its recreation, its transformation 
beyond the usual boundaries of the nation, on the other.  It is in culture, as 
much as in law and structures of global governance, that global citizenship 
must be created if it is to become a reality rather than a normative ideal. 
 
The aims of the Global Call to Action against Poverty are complex and far-
reaching, involving all the Millennium Development Goals (including 
achieving democratic governance, ending discrimination against women, 
establishing liberal human rights etc).  But the global strategy (‘think globally, 
act locally’) meant that each national campaign took up the themes most 
relevant to its own government.  The campaign aimed to be especially 
prominent in 2005 in all the countries involved because the UN was due to 
review the Millennium Development Goals that year.  Its main focus was the 
G8 summit in July – as the most powerful forum of global economic 
governance; followed by the UN summit on Millennium Development Goals in 
Septemer; and the WTO forum in December.   In 2005 the UK was the host of 
the G8 summit, held in Edinburgh, and Make Poverty History focussed on 
putting pressure on the government to achieve three clear and simple 
economic goals: aid – increase it to come close to the 0.7% of GDP target 
promised in the 1970s; debt - cancelling 100% of debt to multilateral 
institutions for those countries eligible under the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Country rules, widening of the criteria of eligibility for debt cancellation, and 
setting up fair and transparent processes for cancelling or repaying other debt; 
trade justice – enabling developing countries to take control of their national 
economies by ending subsidies on Northern agricultural goods, tariffs on 
importing manufactured goods from the South and the dumping of surpluses 
in the South.  The slogan of the campaign was ‘justice not charity’: the 
demands were for the restructuring of international institutions and socio-
economic relations, not for Northerners as individuals to give money directly 
to those suffering the effects of injustice. 
 
The Global Call to Action against Poverty aimed, then, to work with the 
structures of global governance rather than to destroy them.  It is an anti-
poverty campaign, not anti-capitalist or anti-globalisation (and it was criticised 
by radical groups as such).  Indeed, Make Poverty History presupposed that 
structures of capitalist global governance made the goal of ending poverty 
possible for the first time, and this was one of the platforms of the campaign.  
Most important of the conditions that made it possible is what we can call the 
‘cosmopolitanising state’.   
 
As an ideal-type, the ‘cosmopolitanising state’ can be defined by two principal 
features that distinguish it from the classic sovereign state: 
i) state sovereignty is shared in international institutions of co-operative global 
governance  and in accordance with international treaties, agreements and 
norms (Held 1995, 2002); 
ii) state legitimacy depends upon the extent to which policy actors acting on 
behalf of states conform to international agreements and norms (Crawford and 
Marks in Archibugi et al. 1998; Beetham 1999).  
 
Ending poverty is possible now, therefore, not just because of scientific 
technology – medical, agricultural, industrial; but also because of new political 
technologies.  The cosmopolitanising state consists of bureaucratic officials, 
regulators, judges and elected politicians networked with their counterparts 
from other states across borders to draw up, reach agreement on, regulate and 
police international norms, largely through ‘soft power’ but borrowing the 
traditional monopoly over violence of modern states if necessary and where it 
is possible to do so (see Slaughter 2004).  As such, networks of the 
cosmopolitanising state ‘stretch’ traditional modern state institutions in space, 
offering the potential for moving the concerns of global politics away from 
traditional struggles over sovereignty, readiness for war, and wealth-producing 
territory towards issues of mutual concern: peace, the world economy, 
environmental sustainability, human rights.   
 
The cosmopolitanising state was crucial as a condition of the Global Call to 
Action against Poverty, and practical understanding of the potential of these 
new conditions was the primary strength of the campaign.  It aimed to put 
pressure from below (to meet pressure from above – from the United Nations) 
on states to make them live up to the ideals of the cosmopolitanising state, to 
put pressure on politicians, especially those leaders of G8 nations, often 
described as ‘world leaders’, to transcend national interests and to create 
policy in the name of a global demos that only has representation through the 
states system; to represent those who are not represented in international 
institutions through the procedures of internationally powerful national states.  
As one branch of that campaign, Make Poverty History similarly aimed to 
make good on the promise of the cosmopolitanising state.  As such it 
attempted to make national citizens into global citizens.  The citizens of the UK 
were to come to understand that ‘their’ state would be illegitimate insofar as 
the elected government acted only to realise national interests because UK 
citizens, acting through ‘their’ state have obligations towards non-nationals 
outside that state’s territorial boundaries.  The campaign could only possibly 
succeed, however, by using the legitimate democratic procedures of the 
national state – in order to transcend it.  There is a real paradox at work in 
Make Poverty History, then – real because it is not just a paradox in thought, 
but in practices themselves: citizens using the structures and democratic 
procedures of their (cosmopolitanising) state must feel and act as global 
citizens.   
 
How was pressure on the cosmopolitanising state created?  In many ways it 
was created by conventional means: writing letters, petitions, demonstrations 
– albeit supplemented by texting and emailing.  In these terms the campaign 
was very successful: large numbers of people turned out to hear Nelson 
Mandela speak in Trafalgar Square in February 2005; there was a huge 
international demonstration at the G8 in Edinburgh in July; 750,000 ‘votes for 
Trade Justice’ were delivered to Tony Blair at 10 Downing Street in December 
and so on.  Conventional campaigning tools are necessarily mediated; there is 
no possible political campaigning without media (even if we only think of fliers 
and posters, but today campaigns also involve the internet, mobile phones and 
so on (Scott and Street 2001)).  However, this campaign was not just mediated 
in the sense that organisations were forced to use media in order to try to 
reach people who can make a difference (who’ll write letters, get out into the 
streets, vote and so on).  It was a campaign that not only took place through 
the media; to a large extent, especially in the UK, it took place in the media.   
 
Make Poverty History was practically a year long media event in 2005.  It 
began on January 1st on the BBC when a very popular prime time sitcom ‘The 
Vicar of Dibley’ introduced the campaign to a mass audience (the main 
character implored her parishioners to support MPH while footage was shown 
of two children in Africa comforting each other after their mother had died of 
AIDs), and this was soon followed by a march of 600 women clergy on 10, 
Downing St on January 13th.  All through 2005 the BBC ran programmes about 
Africa – largely documentaries, including one narrated by Bob Geldof, but they 
also turned popular drama series over to writers to develop the focus (eg 
‘Holby City’ was set in Ghana) during Africa TV week.  Most highly publicised 
was a one-off drama, ‘The Girl in the Café’ by Richard Curtis (writer and 
director of ‘4 Weddings and a Funeral’, ‘Notting Hill’ and other box office hits), 
which was unashamed agitprop for Make Poverty History, a romantic comedy 
set at the G8, which ended with a cliff-hanger: will the politicians do the right 
thing?  Every single newspaper in Britain found a way to join the campaign: 
The Guardian and The Mirror were part of it from the beginning, but by the 
peak of the media excitement, even the Conservative press had joined in (with 
the exception of The Daily Mail, though even they relented occasionally), 
proposing how we could live and buy more ethically as well as covering stories, 
interviews and publishing op-eds on the campaign.  In July media excitement 
over the campaign peaked with Live8 – concerts in 10 venues in 9 different 
countries, broadcast on TV, radio and through the internet all around the 
world and watched, according to the organisers, by 3 billion people.  The 
media was saturated with celebrity stories and viewpoints during the build up 
to Live8, but it is important to bear in mind that, even before this, the 
campaign had a very high media profile.  It was celebrity-led from the very 
beginning of 2005, but it had been strongly represented in the media before 
the sensation of Live8.  
 In practical terms, how did the campaign differ from others?  ‘Cultural politics’ 
is crucial to all social movement campaigns: changing ideas, usually by re-
naming them, to bring ‘ordinary’ people outside the core members of the 
movement to see things from a different perspective are what social 
movements do most effectively when they are successful (Nash 2000).  
Cultural politics was necessary, for example, to make sense of the slogan 
‘justice not charity’, so that people should understand ‘hunger’ as a systemic 
problem of human making, rather than an incidental consequence of natural 
causes, and as preventable by structural changes rather than just bad luck.  
However, there is a way in which cultural politics was more prominent in Make 
Poverty History than in the other contemporary social movement campaign 
because it could only possibly be successful if there was a complete 
reorientation of national ‘politics as usual’.  There needed to be a realisation of 
global solidarity to displace or transform the usual national orientation of 
politics.  As Nancy Fraser has argued, throughout modernity the national 
frame of the Westphalian-Keynsian system of justice has tied procedures and 
community together in such a way that questions of ‘who’ and ‘how’ have not 
been raised (Fraser 2005).  This has surely been the case in the North, though 
the situation has been different elsewhere at different times.  Whether it has 
been a matter of modern struggles over redistribution or for recognition, they 
have almost invariably, if often implicitly, addressed the national state in the 
name of the nation as the political community to whom and for whom justice is 
relevant (with the partial exception of the environmental movement).  With 
globalisation, this national frame is disrupted, and the cosmopolitanising state 
is partly a development to deal with the ‘externalities’ produced 
(environmental damage is the classic example), and partly also driving 
globalisation through new forms of regulation.  The real task of Make Poverty 
History was, therefore, to create a new imagined political community to put 
pressure on the cosmopolitanising state out of national civil society.  It was not 
just a matter of getting people to change their perspectives in order to agree 
with the particular proposals of the campaign and then to take action within 
the ‘normal’ frame of national politics: to write to their MP, to demonstrate, to 
sign a petition.  It was rather a matter of transforming the dominant frame of 
‘national interest’ to conceive of justice more broadly, as concerning those with 
whom national citizens are connected outside the nation.  To be successful, the 
campaign had to enable people to understand themselves as part of a global 
political community, intimately connected with the lives of people far away, 
with whom they might otherwise feel they have nothing in common, through a 
world economic system in which they find themselves not only the super-
privileged rich in relation to others but also, as the citizens of powerful states, 
in a powerful position to alter the life-chances of their fellow human beings 
around the world.  Only if national citizens come to understand global citizens 
as able and obliged to hold politicians to account for injustices systematically 
perpetrated on people in developing countries to further their own ‘national 
interests’ would politicians act to alter ‘politics as usual’.  Indeed, only then 
would politicians sympathetic to the cause have a mandate to so act, or be 
likely to be bold enough to take the necessary measures – given their official 
positions as the elected representatives of the national citizenry.   
 
How could such a change in perspective be achieved for the vast majority of 
the population except through popular media?  It was vital that the popular 
media had to be engaged, not just because campaigns are necessarily mediated 
and this one required such a radical change of perspective amongst the greater 
majority of the electorate, but also because the media in general is not a 
neutral forum in which ideas of ‘national interest’ and global social relations 
are to be worked out.  On the contrary, from newspapers to national public 
broadcasting systems the media itself constructs and consolidates the national 
framing of politics (Billig 1995; Anderson 1983).  From banal nationalism to 
the outright jingoism of the tabloid newspapers, the media itself is closely – 
perhaps inextricably? – tied to the imagining of the national political 
community.  
 
 
 
Showbusiness, not business as usual
As a campaign for ‘justice not charity’, it was essential, therefore, that Make 
Poverty History should be popular, if not populist.   One of the most 
interesting things about the campaign in this respect was its emotional tone – 
the cultural politics of emotions it engaged and elicited as appropriate from 
prospective adherents.  Two overwhelming features of the campaign stand out 
in this respect.   
 
Firstly, the campaign was created as showbusiness.  This was most explicit and 
most evident in the use of celebrities, of course, but the whole media campaign 
was constructed as dramatic, intended to elicit strong emotions and to create 
emotional involvement.  As Bono put it in an interview with The Guardian: 
‘This is showbusiness; we’re creating drama… Years ago we were very 
conscious that in order to prevail on Africa, we would have to get better at 
dramatising the situation so that we could make Africa less of a burden, more 
of an adventure’ (16/6/05).   
 
The campaign was quite simply made for the media (1). There are many 
examples of how drama was achieved.  One was the ‘click’ ad, in which a 
number of celebrities clicked their fingers regularly, each click representing 
another child’s death from preventable causes.  It was banned by Ofcom in 
September 2005 as too political.  It was a very powerful ad – creating a strong 
sense of time and dramatic suspense.  The regular clicks suggested time 
passing without action to prevent another death… and another death… and 
another death…  They also create a sense of simultaneity in time: that death 
happened right now, while I’m here watching, another child has died… and 
another… and another…  Another example of the creation of a sense of drama 
was frequent use of the expression ‘We’ll be watching you’ (from a song by The 
Police, originally ‘I’ll be watching you’).  This phrase, used frequently by 
Geldof, Bono, and others and widely reported in the media, both involved ‘us’ 
– the watchers – and created suspense: what will we see?  What will happen?  
Perhaps most effective at creating suspense and a sense of personal 
involvement, however, was the continual emphasis of the campaign on you as 
the one who can make a difference, as a member of a generation that is unique 
in history.  You are among the generation that can rescue these people from 
their plight.  There was a continual and extraordinarily un-ironic re-stating 
that you can change the world.  This sentence from The Mirror, entreating 
people to buy a white wrist band, symbol of the campaign, well exemplifies the 
theme: ‘Join the celebrities by wearing a white band and help end poverty for 
ever… By wearing a white band, you can be part of the biggest anti-poverty 
drive, joining forces with 150 million people in 60 countries…’ (2/2/05)  Again, 
from The Guardian, ‘In the next 50 days, you can change the world for good.’ 
(15/5/05)   And, from the Make Poverty History website, ‘you can be part of it’ 
(31/5/05).  
 
Secondly, there was a very explicit strategy to elicit pride and joy, feelings of 
empowerment, rather than shame and guilt.  The appropriate feeling solicited 
was righteous anger; you are part of the solution, not part of the problem.  As 
Stan Cohen’s work has shown, eliciting shame and guilt is often 
counterproductive: horrific and disturbing accounts produce denial; we’d 
rather ‘not know what we know’ (Cohen 1995, 2001).  Nor in the case of this 
campaign was ‘compassion for distant suffering’ to the fore as it has been in 
others; it was an important sub-theme, but the heroic rescue narrative was 
much more prominent (Stevenson 1999, Tester 2001).  The strategy of Make 
Poverty History was much closer to that detailed by Luc Boltanski in his 
important book, Distant Suffering: the denunciation of systemic injustice, for 
which the appropriate emotion is indignation and the desire to bring about 
change (Boltanski 1999).  Nelson Mandela’s speech in Trafalgar Sq on 
February 3rd, the very words of which were continually repeated, by activists 
and politicians, is a perfect expression of both these themes, as in the following 
quote: ‘Sometimes it falls upon a generation to be great.  You can be that great 
generation.  Let your greatness blossom…  Make Poverty History in 2005.  
Make History in 2005.  Then we can all stand with our heads high’ 
(ww.makepovertyhistory.org/docs/mandelaspeech.doc).  
 
Make Poverty History linked these emotions to a set of ideas that we might call 
‘globalism’, explicitly set against the taken-for-granted national framework 
within which politics is normally conducted.  Globalism is forward looking and 
inclusive, self-consciously advocating ‘humanity’ as a universal identity.  As 
exclusive totalities, identities need a constitutive outside, an Other, for their 
construction.  The explicit constitutive outside of globalism is not a group of 
people, but systemic injustice (though, as we shall see, in Make Poverty 
History there was, as there perhaps must always be in human relationships, an 
implicit, emobodied Other as well).  ‘The world demands justice’ (MPH press 
release 9/6/05).  In fact, forward-looking, globalism was often articulated 
around an injustice overcome that creates solidarity today.  Again, the speech 
by Mandela, who was introduced by Bob Geldof as ‘President of the World’, set 
the tone here: ‘… [as] long as poverty, injustice and gross inequality persist in 
our world, none of us can truly rest…  The Global Call for Action against 
Poverty can take its place as a public movement alongside the movement to 
abolish slavery and the international solidarity against apartheid.’   
 
Globalism constructs the world as if it were already a single space of global 
citizens.  This was spelled out in a letter to The Mirror ‘We are global citizens, 
not little islanders’ (26/4/05).  As a vision, globalism was not clearly worked 
out in any of the campaign materials of Make Poverty History, nor in political 
speeches, nor representations of the campaign in the media (as it might be, 
theoretically, in terms of a world state and civil society, for example), but the 
construction nevertheless had significant implications for national ‘politics as 
usual’.  A good example is the use of the term ‘public’ in the context of 
globalism.  As Michael Billig has pointed out, ‘the public’, unqualified by 
geographical delimitation, invariably denotes a national public (Billig 1995).  
What globalism achieved in the Make Poverty History campaign, was the 
problematising of this term; it was simply no longer clear quite who it referred 
to.  So, for example, the following quote is not quite claiming that a ‘world 
public’ exists, and certainly not theorising what that might mean.  But leaving 
‘public’ unqualified, as it does, certainly does not return us to a ‘national 
public’.  On the contrary, it allows us to believe that there is a ‘public’ beyond 
the nation, of which we are part.  ‘Today [the demonstration in Edinburgh] has 
been way beyond our expectations.  The fact that 200,000 people gathered in 
Edinburgh to demand that the G8 act now will send a powerful message to the 
G8.  They can be under no illusion about what the public want.  Now is the 
time for action, not empty words.’ (Richard Bennet, Chair of MPH, MPH press 
release 2/7/05) 
 
The term ‘world leaders’ was similarly ambiguous in Make Poverty History, 
and similarly productive of orientations beyond the nation as a result of that 
ambiguity.  As a term, it was hugely important in the campaign.  Apparently a 
simple description of ‘our’ elected leaders, it simultaneously denoted – without 
problematising the description – the leaders of the most powerful economic 
countries in the world and at the same time British politicians.  The fact that 
‘our’ leaders are not elected by the world as such is completely obscured in this 
formulation.  It was very important to the campaign because what it allowed 
was representation of ‘the public’ invoked to bring pressure to bear on ‘our’ 
elected leaders – without calling the legitimacy of their leadership, or of ‘our’ 
status as ‘the public’ into question.  The slippage between the two is well-
exemplified in this quote from Emma Freud (a TV presenter closely involved in 
the campaign): ‘The world leaders are our representatives.  They are only there 
because we elected them.  If they truly believe their voters want this, it will 
happen’ (The Sun 25/4/05).   
 
In order to highlight the globalism of Make Poverty History, with all its 
limitations and ambiguities, it is useful to contrast it with the very different 
way in which the emotions of pride and joy were elicited in the national 
context of the US.  Like Make Poverty History, ONE – its sister organisation 
there, with which it had close links - had as its aim, ‘justice not charity’, but it 
took a very particular approach to getting that message across – one which 
emphasised America’s greatness and generosity.  Bono told Time that he was 
advised to appeal to America’s greatness (27/6/05) and he did, referring to 
America as: ‘not just a country, but also an idea’, that people who want to be 
free and equal should be ‘embraced’ (Q & A with Bono 22/9/05).  ONE 
fostered pride (we are the generation) and empowerment (we can make 
poverty history) whilst filling out the ‘we’ with nationalism rather than an 
appeal to global solidarity as such.  For example, the slogan of ONE, which 
appeared frequently in their press releases, was the following: ‘ONE is a new 
effort by Americans to rally Americans, ONE by ONE, to fight AIDs and 
extreme poverty’.  Similarly, nationalist, is the ONE Declaration that ‘We 
believe that in the best American tradition of helping others to help 
themselves, now is the time to join with other countries in a historic pact for 
compassion and justice to help the poorest people of the world overcome AIDs 
and extreme poverty’ (www.one.org 5/12/05).  This kind of approach surely 
was appropriate to its national context, though the campaign didn’t take off in 
the US as it did in the UK, despite A-list celebrity endorsement.  But if it had, 
it’s not clear that it would have made much of an impact on altering 
commitments to ‘national interests’.  Compare, for example, Bush’s 
pronouncement, presumably intended to play well at home, but widely quoted 
in the UK media as quite at odds with the sentiments that had been building 
up in this national context:  ‘I come [to the G8 summit in Scotland] with an 
agenda that I think is best for our country’ (from an interview with Trevor 
McDonald on ‘Tonight’, ITV 3/7/05) 
 
A second approach within Make Poverty History, as prevalent as globalism in 
the UK, was a kind of hybrid of globalism and nationalism: ‘cosmopolitan 
nationalism’.  It was especially invoked by politicians, by Tony Blair but even 
more by Gordon Brown, who managed to position themselves as the leaders of 
the campaign and were widely supported as such in the UK media (to the 
consternation of the NGOs involved in the coalition, who saw themselves at 
odds with New Labour over neo-liberal policies on trade, and to the point 
where critics derided MPH as a PR exercise for the government.  See Ann 
Talbot ‘Live 8: who organised the PR campaign for Blair and Bush’ 
www.wsws.org 11/7/05; also Stuart Hodgkinson ‘G8? Africa Nil’ Red Pepper 
November 2005)).  ‘Cosmopolitan nationalism’ is a kind of hybrid between 
globalism and nationalism.  It has two main components in this context.  
Firstly, Britain is the greatest nation because it leads the world in developing 
globalist values and policy in international institutions.  In cosmopolitan 
nationalism the fact that Britain had the Presidency of the G8 in 2005 was 
sometimes presented as if the UK were literally leading the world in ending 
poverty (despite the UK’s relative meanness with regard to aid, its 
commitment to neo-liberalism and so on) (eg ‘Remarks by the Rt Hon Gordon 
Brown MP Chancellor of the Exchequer on Debt Relief’ 14/1/05).  Secondly, 
cosmopolitan nationalism involved enlightened self-interest: it is not that we 
give up our national interests to help non-national others; but we help people 
out of poverty and despair to prevent terrorism and mass migration that will 
harm our nation (eg Tony Blair’s Mansion House speech 15/11/05).     
 
Interestingly, globalism continually risked slipping into cosmopolitan 
nationalism.  For example, in this quote from The Mirror, a summary of the 
campaign in 2005, ‘This is only the beginning.  The British public and the 
world’s conscience are watching the politicians more closely than ever before 
on behalf of the world’s poor…’ (under the headline ‘How You Helped Make 
Poverty History in 2005’ 2/1/06).  And again, from Chris Martin of Coldplay, a 
quote that also exemplifies the ambiguity of ‘world leaders’: ‘World leaders 
only do things they think will please their voting public.  Britain is amazing – it 
really cares about this stuff.’ (The Mirror 1/6/05)     
 
Why isn’t poverty history? 
Immediate criticisms by NGOs, who disagreed with Geldof’s initial assessment, 
and with the British government, suggested that the result of Make Poverty 
History was charity not justice: while a little more money was produced for 
developing countries, nothing was done to restructure economic policies that 
produce the gross inequalities and suffering at which the campaign aimed (eg 
‘Small Change’ produced by World Development Movement June 2006).  And 
this has come to be the received wisdom on the campaign.  Even Geldof, slated 
by NGOs for acclaiming Make Poverty History as a success after the G8 
summit in 2005, has been publicly critical of the outcome in 2006 on very 
similar grounds (eg BBC News website press release 29/6/06).  (Cf Larry Elliot 
in The Guardian 3/7/06 for one of the very few alternative views.)  Although 
Make Poverty History was hugely successful in constructing a public space for 
its claims and in mobilising popular sentiment for its aims, then, it is generally 
agreed that ultimately, it was a terrible failure.  Make Poverty History may 
have achieved something of a shift in UK politics, putting world development 
on the agenda of domestic politics in the election of 2005, for example, in 
which all the major parties promised to increase aid to 0.7% by 2013.  But it 
failed to achieve any of its concrete aims in changing global economic policy, 
and it surely also failed to achieve genuine cosmopolitan solidarity across state 
borders.   
 
What is solidarity?  Solidarity requires more than identity: a shared sense of 
values and relevant facts and dispositions to act in certain ways as a result.   It 
also requires social relationships across differences, the shared appreciation of 
material risks and benefits that are unevenly distributed and yet experienced 
as of common concern to the group.  This is how nationalism, on a continuum 
from ethnic to civic, has supported national citizenship to the point where it is 
now the global norm.  As we see in the case of nationalism, solidarity has an 
important emotional component.  The constructed ‘we’ must feel solidarity; we 
must feel ourselves to be interdependent in a ‘community of fate’.  There is 
little doubt that Make Poverty History did achieve feelings of this kind, at least 
within the UK.  Feelings of interdependence are not enough, however; ‘we’ 
must also have some understanding of how relations of interdependence 
amongst us are lived differently and what that means for the community as a 
whole.   
 The much-criticised absence of African accounts of the campaign in the media 
is a symptom of the failure of Make Poverty History in this respect (see, for 
example, Yasmin Alabhai-Brown ‘Bob Geldof and the White Man’s Burden’, 
The Independent 6/6/2005).  In Boltanski’s terms the failure of Make Poverty 
History to achieve solidarity is an ever-present danger in the cultural politics of 
moral condemnation: the feeling for the suffering of distant people, which the 
campaign undoubtedly did achieve, degenerated from a collective 
understanding of ‘our’ moral obligation to do something to alleviate that 
suffering into narcissistic sentimentalism. The absence of African voices was 
structured – African intellectuals were critical of the campaign, in contrast to 
those Africans represented as the grateful recipients of ‘our’ help.  Across the 
focal points of the campaign, criticism was virtually uniformly identified with 
cynicism and not permitted.  In this respect critics of Make Poverty History are 
the embodied Other of its apparently universally inclusive ‘we’, who are 
rightfully angry about the continuing existence of global poverty and who want 
to see it ended, excluded in order to make the universal ‘we’ possible (2).  An 
illustration of this failure comes in a quote from a Scottish student responding 
to John Kamau, a Nairobi journalist in Edinburgh for the G8 summit, who 
asked him whether he should be hopeful about the outcome: ‘This is not only 
about you, it is about our humanity’ (J. Kamau and O. Burkeman ‘Trading 
Places’ The Guardian 4/7/05).  Obviously such a stance, whilst possibly 
displaying a strong sense of responsibility for the world, at the same time risks 
a narcissism that hardly reaches for understanding across differences.  
Involving more than just identity, cosmopolitan solidarity requires the working 
through and incorporation of different perspectives from positions of (in this 
case, gross) inequality and conflicting socio-economic interests to reach 
consensus on how “we” nevertheless belong together, sharing mutually-
recognised belonging to a community of fate.   
 
What, if anything, can we learn from the failure of Make Poverty History?  
Here I want to briefly consider three possible reasons why Make Poverty 
History failed: why it failed to achieve its stated aims in terms of the economic 
policies of the G8, and why it failed to achieve genuine cosmopolitan solidarity, 
degenerating into sentimental narcissism rather than launching an ongoing 
mobilisation of demands for global citizenship. 
 
Firstly, it is argued by radicals on the left that Make Poverty History could 
never succeed because there was a structural deficit in the campaign.  On this 
reasoning the campaign could never succeed precisely because it tried to work 
through existing international institutions which are structured to benefit rich 
and powerful states.  Aimed at privileged states, it was naïve to expect existing 
international institutions to use the power they have to give away some of 
those advantages to poor, weak states.  The campaign was therefore a failure in 
its very conception and shows a deficient understanding of the social relations 
between rich and poor.  Undoubtedly this is a telling criticism, backed up 
thorough analysis (eg George Monbiot ‘Africa’s New Best Friends’ 
monbiot.com, posted 7/7/05).  However, it is the case that any campaign to 
democratise international structures would also be faced with a similar 
problem: how could some kind of international democracy possibly be 
achieved except by privileged states giving up their privileges?  In this sense 
Make Poverty History activists are correct in their analysis: persuading those 
who profit from the misery of others to stop is like trying to abolish slavery, 
end apartheid or, perhaps more appositely, to enfranchise the working class.   
 
The second possible reason that Make Poverty History failed may have been 
that there was a deliberative deficit in the campaign.  By using the term 
‘deliberative’ I do not mean to suggest that the campaign could only have 
succeeded on the basis of a Habermasian rational consensus.  On the contrary: 
the originality of the campaign, and its success in mobilising popular 
sentiment and in shifting something of the common-sense understanding of 
rights and responsibilities as based exclusively on national belonging, are 
surely attributable to an understanding of politics as agonistic, as involving the 
more or less strategic use of emotion, images and values in order to win allies 
to the cause (Mouffe 1993).  It is very unlikely that a more austere and 
intellectually critical debate would have been more effective.  Moreover, the 
campaign did engage in rational persuasion: emotions and reasoned 
judgement are complementary not antithetical and the campaign was not 
exclusively based on ‘feel-good’ emotional excitement.  Arguments, however 
inadequate and incomplete were made as to why ‘national interests’ were less 
appropriate and attractive than ‘globalism’ or ‘cosmopolitan nationalism’ when 
it comes to matters of poverty, and facts about poverty in the developing world 
and how the aims of the campaign would deal with it, were effectively 
presented – actually to a surprising extent - in much of the mainstream media 
coverage, including the tabloids, as well as on the Make Poverty History 
website.    
 
There was, however, a deliberative deficit in one particular respect: what the 
mainstream media campaign did not do was to take on the job of persuading 
‘us’ that we should mandate national/world leaders to enact economic policies 
that would explicitly go against ‘our’ national interests.  The campaign 
mobilised support for policies beyond national interests, but did not take up 
the difficulties of conflicts of interests between rich Northerners and poor 
Southerners.  Cancelling debt and increasing aid cost very little in proportion 
to national income in the North. Trade justice, on the other hand, would 
require the liberalising of Northern economies and the protection of 
developing ones to enable them to grow, and this would undoubtedly increase 
prices and threaten jobs in the North.  There was some consideration of the 
effects of such a restructuring - in the popular papers as well as the qualities 
(eg article by George Alagiah in The Observer 3/7/05; and one by Chris Martin 
in The Mirror 15/12/05).  However, there was certainly no sustained media 
debate over politicians’ responsibilities to citizens as compared to non-citizens 
where there is a conflict of interests between them.  There was, therefore, no 
developed consensus on how rights and responsibilities should be balanced 
and distributed when it came to making policies on global poverty.  And 
without sure knowledge of such a consensus, which ‘world leader’ would put 
the interests of non-citizens above those of voters in drawing up or putting into 
practice such policies? 
 
Was a media deficit also one of the reasons for the failure of Make Poverty 
History?  Or to put it another way, what do we learn from this campaign about 
the capacities of the media for realising the changes in subjectivity necessary to 
realise the ideals of the cosmopolitanising state and of the global citizenship 
they appear to imply?  One interesting thing about Make Poverty History was 
the way in which different media enabled the construction of ‘globalism’ and 
‘cosmopolitan nationalism’ that is rather at odds with usual understandings of 
their functions.  Most notably, the Make Poverty History website was not solely 
responsible for carrying globalism, whilst newspapers did not conform to their 
status as the exemplars of the imagined community as national.  In fact, the 
Make Poverty History website acted very similarly to a paper-based medium in 
that it confined itself to presenting the facts that made the campaign 
important, reporting news of actions past and future, publishing press releases 
and selling merchandise.  It did not create a space for interaction – a blog or 
discussion forum - presumably to avoid criticism of the campaign.  On the 
other hand, many newspapers also made themselves into campaigning tools, 
as well as carrying the more traditional reports: giving the MPH website 
address, email addresses and numbers to text ‘world leaders’, urging us to 
demonstrate and – in the case of the Financial Times, creating an online 
petition (http://www.g8rally.com/).   
 
What we learn from Make Poverty History in this respect then, is that in the 
context of the cosmopolitanising state, paradigmatically national media can 
and do represent globalism to newspaper readers.  The identity of the global 
citizen, feeling cosmopolitan solidarity with suffering non-citizens far away can 
be constructed from within the cosmopolitanising state.  What is much more 
difficult, perhaps impossible, is to construct equitable social relations across 
borders from within the territorially bounded public space of a single state.  To 
do so would surely require not just more equitable structures of global 
governance, but also genuinely popular transnational media in which material 
commonalities and differences were debated from divergent socio-economic 
perspectives as well as creating and sustaining emotionally charged campaigns 
like Make Poverty History.    The restructuring of global governance and such a 
transformation in media consumption and production both seem unlikely, 
however, without a huge transformation in our conception of ourselves as 
‘people’ who live in one particular territory and who make up ‘a (global, 
political) people’.  And where is such a transformation to take place except in 
the popular media? 
 
 
Notes  
1. This is not to say, however, that Make Poverty History should be considered 
a ‘psuedo-event’ (Boorstin 1992).  There is no reason to suppose that the 
intentions of those involved was to create or to participate in a media event as 
such, rather than to bring about real change in the world. 
 
2. Racism was an also an issue here: justifications for the absence of Afirican 
musicians from Live8 were different, but the effects were similarly 
exclusionary. 
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